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KNOWING  THE  UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION  OF
HUMAN  RIGHTSt
Mary Ann Glendon*
Interviewer:  Finally, Mrs. Roosevelt,  is there any  way  that students can
help to make the Declaration of Human Rights a living document?
Roosevelt:  Well, I really think the area in which students should  function is
first of all they should know  the Declaration  which we agreed that we would
strive to implement in our own country.1
The United Nation's Universal  Declaration of Human Rights of
1948  is  the single  most important  reference  point for cross-cultural
discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world today.  As de-
scribed in a leading text, "It is the parent document, the initial burst
of enthusiasm  and idealism,  terser, more  general and grander than
the treaties, in some sense the constitution of the entire movement-
the single most invoked human rights instrument."2  As it reaches its
fiftieth anniversary, the Declaration  is already showing signs of having
achieved  the status of holy writ within  the human  rights movement.
Public  figures  nod briefly  in  its direction when  the  occasion  arises.
Cults have formed around  selected  provisions.  It is widely  admired,
but little read.  The Declaration as a whole  is scarcely known.
The loss  of, or, more  precisely, the failure  to acquire a sense  of
the Declaration as an integral body of principles has facilitated a host
of opportunistic interpretations and uses.  The prevailing approach to
the rights contained in its thirty articles is a pick-and-choose  cafeteria-
style.  The sections  devoted  to traditional  political and  civil liberties
t  Copyright © Mary Ann Glendon  1998.
*  The Learned Hand Professor of Law,  Harvard University.
1  HoW~ARD  LANGER,  HuMAN  RIcHTs:  A DOCUMENTARY  ON  THE  UNITED  NATIONS
DECLARATION  OF  HuMAN  RIGHTS  FEATURING  AN  INTERVIEw  WITH  MRs.  ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT  (Folkways Records  1958).
2  HENRY  STEINER  &  PHILIP ALSTON,  INTERNATIONAL  HuMAN  RIGHTS  IN  CONTEX
120  (1996).NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
are frequently, but unevenly, invoked.3  The provisions on social  and
economic justice are commonly ignored, even  by major human rights
organizations.4  The family protection principles have come under di-
rect assault.5  Though  virtually  all  U.N.  members  are  committed  in
principle  to  the proposition  that the Declaration's rights are univer-
sal,6 some international actors openly maintain that all rights are rela-
tive,7  others  assert  the  priority  of economic  interests  over  human
rights,8  and still others charge that universality is a cover for Western
imperialism.9  The  efforts  of special  interest  groups  to  impose  their
agendas  in  the form  of rights  lend  credibility  to fears  of  cultural
imperialism. 1 0
In its fiftieth year, the universal  rights project can evoke,  even in
the  minds  of its friends,  disquieting  thoughts  of another  ambitious
human undertaking:  the ill-fated tower built by the men of the Valley
of Shinar who wanted their very own staircase to heaven."  Were phil-
osophical  rights  skeptics,  such  as  Michel  Villey  and  Alasdair
MacIntyre,  right, after  all,  that something  is intrinsically  wrong with
the universal  rights  idea?  Villey,  noting  the  tensions among  several
basic  rights  (e.g. liberty and  equality),  argued that the whole  idea is
hopelessly  incoherent:  "Each  of  the  so-called  human  rights  is  the
3  Aryeh Neier observes that "the main impact [of human rights]  today comes in
curbing  abuses  by  governments  that  lack  geopolitical  or  economic  significance.
When human  rights abuses occur in countries of first-rank importance,  governments
and  intergovernmental  bodies that could  have  influence  pay lip service-at best to
the problem."  Aryeh Neier,  The New Double Standard,  FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97,
at 91.
4  See  STEINER  & ALSTON,  supra note  2,  at  269;  Lynn  Freedman,  Reflections  on
Emerging Frameworks of Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH  AND  HUM.  RTs.  314,  329
(1994).
5  See Mary Ann Glendon,  What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS, Jan.  1996,  at
30,  32.
6  The Vienna Declaration  adopted in 1993 at the Second World Conference  on
Human Rights provides in section 1  (5)  that "[a] 11  human rights are universal, indivisi-
ble,  and interdependent and interrelated."
7  For example,  China's Premier WeiJiang told President Clinton that "concepts
on democracy,  on human rights, and on freedoms are relative."  John F. Harris,  U.S.-
China Summit on a Tightrope, INT'L HERALD  TRIB.,  Oct. 31,  1997,  at 1.
8  See Seth Mydans,  Do Rights Come First? Asia and  Europe Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1996,  at A8; Steven  Myers,  Business Interests Overshadow Human Rights, Survey Results,
N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  5,  1996, at A8.
9  See SAMUEL  P.  HUNTINGTON,  THE  CLASH  OF  CIVILIZATIONS  AND  THE  MAKING  OF
WORLD  ORDER  38,  195  (1996).
10  For a developing world perspective,  see Amartya Sen, Population:  Delusion and
Reality, N.Y.  REv.  oF BooKs,  Sept. 22,  1994, at 62.
11  Genesis 11:1-9.
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negation  of other rights.' 2  Maclntyre  warned that to combine  frag-
ments  of different  conceptual  schemes,  resting upon incommensur-
able  moral  premises,  is  a  recipe  for  mischief.'3  Belief  in  human
lights, he scoffed,  "is one with belief in witches and unicorns."'14  Gar-
den variety cynics regard the  1948 Declaration  as just a hodge-podge
of ideas that emerged from deals cut after World War II, with no more
coherence than a typical federal statute.
With all the turmoil that surrounds the human rights enterprise,
it  is  natural  to wonder  whether  the  design  of the  Declaration  was
faulty and the aims of its framers unrealistic.  My own current research
on the origins of the Declaration,  however, has led  me to increased
admiration for the project of 1948, and for the men and women who
dedicated themselves  to it.  I am struck by the prescience  with which
the framers anticipated the problems that might arise, and impressed
by the safeguards  they devised to help  minimize future difficulties.  I
am moved by the vision of the men and women who, after two world
wars which gave them every reason to despair about the human condi-
tion, did what they could to help make  the world a better and safer
place.  This essay aims to pay tribute to that version by taking seriously
Mrs.  Roosevelt's admonition to "know" the Declaration.
I.  WHAT  THE  PHILOSOPHERS  KNEW
The problem of universality loomed large from the moment the
idea of an "international bill of rights" was conceived in the aftermath
of World War II.  Was it really possible for the fledging United Nations
to produce a document acceptable  to delegates from fifty-eight coun-
tries containing four-fifths of the world's population (twenty-one  from
the Americas, sixteen from Europe, fourteen from Asia, four from Af-
rica, and three from Oceania)?  Six member nations were within the
emerging  socialist  bloc;  in  eleven,  Islamic  culture  was  strong;  four
countries  had  a  large  Buddhist  population;  and  thirty-seven  were
more or less marked byJudeo-Christian traditions and enlightenment
thought.  It was  by no means certain  that a universal  declaration  of
rights was feasible.
In 1946, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization  (UNESCO)  appointed a committee composed of many
of the leading  thinkers  of the  day  to  search  for areas  of potential
agreement  among  different  cultural  and  philosophical  traditions.
This  blue-ribbon  "Committee  on  the  Theoretical  Bases  of Human
12  MICHEL ViLEY,  LE DROIT ET LES  DROITS  DE  L'HOMME 12-13  (1983).
13  See ALASDAIR  MAcINT'RE,  AFTER VIRTUE  1-21  (1981)."
14  Id. at 67.
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Rights" was  chaired  by Cambridge  historian  E.H. Carr.  University  of
Chicago  philosopher Richard  McKeon  was  the Rapporteur,  and Jac-
ques  Maritain  was  one  of the  most active  members.  They began  by
sending an elaborate questionnaire to statesman and scholars in every
part of the world. 15  Replies were  received reflecting on human rights
from Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, and customary law perspectives,  as well
as from the United  States, Europe,  and the countries  of the  socialist
bloc.  The  respondents  included  such notables as  Mahatma Gandhi,
Benedetto  Croce,  Pierre  Teilhard  de  Chardin,  and  Aldous  Huxley.
To  the Committee's  surprise, the  lists of basic  rights and values  they
received  from their  far-flung  sources  were  essentially similar.16  Mc-
Keon's final report recorded their conclusion that it was indeed possi-
ble  to  achieve  agreement  across  cultures  concerning  certain  rights
that "may be viewed as implicit in man's nature as an individual and as
a member  of society.
17
The Committee  members well understood  how thin that sort of
agreement was.  Maritain liked to tell the story of how a visitor to one
meeting had expressed astonishment that champions of violently op-
posed ideologies had agreed on a list of fundamental rights.  The man
was told, 'Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks
us why."18  Maritain and his colleagues  did not regard this lack of con-
sensus on foundations  as fatal.  The fact that an agreement could be
achieved  across  cultures  on several  practical  concepts was  "enough,"
Maritain wrote,  "to enable  a great task to be undertaken."1 9  Such an
agreement,  McKeon  stressed,  would  at  least  provide  a  "framework
within which  divergent philosophical,  religious,  and  even economic,
social and political  theories might be entertained  and developed." 20
More serious than divergence on the "why" of each right, the phi-
losophers  realized, would  be the  problems  of arriving at a  common
understanding  of what the  principles  meant, of reconciling  tensions
among the various rights, of integrating new rights, and of incorporat-
ing new applications.  In that connection,  Maritain observed  that the
document should  ideally "cover the scale  of values,  the key in which,
15  The Committee's report,  the questionnaire,  and several  of the responses are
collected with an introduction  by Jacques Maritain in HuMAN RIGHTS:  COMMENTS  AND
INTERPRETATIONS  (UNESCO  ed.,  1949).
16  Jacques Maritain,  Introduction, in  HuMAN  RGHTS:  COMMENTS  AND  INTERPRETA-
TIONS  10  (UNESCO  ed.,  1949).
17  Richard McKeon,  The Philosophic  Bases and Material  Circumstances of the Rights of
Man, in  HUMAN  RIGHTS:  COMMENTS  AND  INTERPRETATIONS,  supra note 16,  at 45.
18  Maritain,  supra note  16, at 9.
19  Id.  at 10.
20  McKeon,  supra note  17, at 35.
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in  their practical  exercise  in social  life,  the acknowledged  rights  of
man must be hannonized."21  Everything  depends, he continued,  on
"the ultimate  value  whereon  those  rights  depend  and  in terms  of
which they are integrated  by mutual limitations."22
McKeon foresaw another problem.  Different understandings  of
the meanings of rights usually reflect divergent concepts of man and
of society, which  in  turn  cause  the  persons who  hold  those under-
standings  to have  different views of reality.  Thus, he  predicted that
"difficulties  will be  discovered  in the suspicions,  suggested  by these
differences,  concerning  the tangential uses that might be made of a
declaration of human  rights for the purpose of advancing special  in-
terests."23  That  is  a  philosopher's  way  of saying,  "Watch  out, this
whole enterprise  could be hijacked."
II.  WHAT  THE  AMERS  DID
While  the UNESCO  Committee was winding up its investigation
of the  theoretical  bases for human  rights,  the U.N.  Commission on
Human  Rights, headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, was preparing to draft
an international bill or declaration.  The task that faced the Commis-
sion was daunting.  Proposals, models, and ideas had poured in from
all over the world.24  How could they ever be analyzed, evaluated, and
integrated  into a document that the then fifty-eight member nations
of the U.N. would find acceptable?
The  Commission was  set up  with  eighteen  members,  with  five
seats  allocated  to the  representatives  of the "great powers"-China,
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The remaining thirteen seats were assigned on a rotating basis to dif-
ferent countries, so that, according to Roosevelt, "there should be due
regard to distribution throughout the world, so that...  there would
be no part of the world whose  interests would not be considered. '25
The  group's  very size  and  scope,  however,  could  easily have  led to
21  Maritain, supra note  16, at 15-16.
22  Id
23  McKeon,  supra note 17, at 35.
24  Among the  most important  preparatory materials  were an  analysis  of all  ex-
isting  treatments of human rights  at the national  level  and the draft proposal  that
became  the  1948  Pan-American  Declaration  of Human  Rights  and  Duties  (the so-
called Bogota Declaration)  sponsored by the regional organization that later became
the Organization of American States.  The  analytical survey was prepared by a Cana-
dian,John P. Humphrey, the permanent head of the Division of Human Rights in the
U.N.  Secretariat.  Cassin  acknowledged  a  debt  to  Humphrey's  "excellent work" in
REN9  CAssrN,  LA PENSfE  ET L'AcTION  108 (1972).
25  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, THE  AUTOBIOGRAPHY  OF  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 315  (1961).
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grave difficulties.  The framers might well have  ended up like  the ar-
chitects  in Pieter Brueghel  the Elder's rendition  of the Tower of Ba-
bel, poring despondently over their plans in the shadow of a crazy pile
constructed by a consortium, each of whose members had a somewhat
different conception  of what the whole should look like.
The work in fact got off to  a rocky start when  the leadership  of
the  Commission  (Mrs.  Roosevelt,  President;  China's  Peng-Chun
Chang, Vice-President;  and Lebanon's Charles Malik, Rapporteur)  ap-
pointed  itself as  the  drafting subcommittee.  After several  delegates
protested  that the  group  was  insufficiently  representative,  the  mem-
bership was expanded to eight by adding the delegates from Australia,
Chile, England, France, and the Soviet Union.26  Happily for the Uni-
versal  Declaration,  this  potentially unwieldy assemblage  appointed  a
four-person  "working" group.  That  smaller group, composed  of the
American, English,  French, and Lebanese members, in turn chose  to
put a single  author in charge of the  actual drafting  process.
The lot fell to one of the most distinguished jurists of the twenti-
eth century.  Ren6  Cassin had been General  Charles de  Gaulle's prin-
cipal  legal  adviser  during World  War  II,  and  was  entrusted  by  de
Gaulle at war's end with the formidable  task of rehabilitating the com-
promised  French  administrative  system. 27  So far  as  the  Declaration
was concerned, it was fortuitous that Cassin was a pioneer of the study
of comparative  law.28  He was also experienced in the art of legislative
drafting,  having  drawn  up  the  instruments  constituting  the  govern-
ment of the Free French during  the war.29
26  See PHILIPPE  DE  LA  CHAPELLE,  LA  DECLARATION  UNIVERSELLE  DES  DROITS  DE
L'HOMME ET LE  CATHOLICISME  34  (1967).
27  The principal  biographies are MARC  AcI,  RENt  CASSIN:  FANTASSIN DES DROITS
DE L'HOMME  (1979);  and GERARD  ISRAEL,  RENE  CASSIN  (1990).  Among the many key
positions held by Cassin after the war were the presidency of the Conseil d'Etat, the
presidency of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration,  the presidency of the European
Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, and membership on the French Constitutional
Council.
28  In his memoirs, Cassin  observed: "The study of comparative  law is always  use-
ful.  But when one seeks ...  as in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights  to identify a
certain  number of common  principles  concerning  the fundamental  rights  of every
human being, comparative  law becomes  a  necessity."  CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 224.
29  See ISRAEL,  supra note 27, at 181.  Cassin later recalled  his uneasiness when  he
found, at the first meeting of the Commission,  that many of the  eighteen delegates
had no legal  training whatsoever.  Cassin,  supra note  24, at 105.  For a discussion  of
the continental  advantage in legislative  drafting, see  Mary Ann Glendon,  Comment,  in
ANTONIN  SCALIA,  A MATTER  OF  INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE  LAW  95,
95-114  (1997).
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Cassin's background in a civil law system where drafting skills are
highly prized facilitated a response  to Maritain's  call for a document
with a hermeneutical  "key."  The Preamble  and the Proclamation,  as
well as Articles I and 2 of the thirty-article Declaration, belong to what
in continental  legal  terminology is  called  the "general  part."  These
sections  set forth  premises,  purposes,  and principles  that guide the
interpretation of the specifically enumerated rights in Articles 3 to 27.
The  Declaration's  last  three  articles,  again,  contain  interpretive
guides, contextualizing  rights in relation  to limits, duties, and the so-
cial and political order in which they are to be realized.
When  the Declaration  emerged from the  drafting committee,  it
was recognizably  "civilian" in form and style.  Since the civil  law tradi-
tion then,  as now, was the most widely distributed legal  tradition in
the world,30  that meant the draft had a familial resemblance,  not only
to  rights  declarations  in  continental European  constitutions,  but to
the constitutions and charters that had appeared  or were soon to ap-
pear in many Latin American, African,  and Asian countries.
The  draft  was  submitted  to  all U.N.  member governments  for
comments  and to  the full Human Rights  Commission for debate.  In
the process,  it went through several revisions.  There was no nation,
according  to Cassin, that did not "usefully contribute  to  the improve-
ment of the  draft through suggestions  or criticisms."'3'  The fact that
representatives  from many countries  had contributed  to  its content,
plus  the broad  process  of consultation  that preceded  and accompa-
nied the drafting  stage, helped to ease  the way for its ultimate adop-
tion by the General Assembly.
Behind the  scenes work by Roosevelt must have  contributed to-
ward  that  end  as  well.  Early  on,  she  initiated  informal  meetings
among  women  delegates  and found the custom  so  fruitful  that she
broadened it. She began getting together with U.N. representatives  of
different  nationalities  on a semi-social  basis.  Malik  and Chang, the
most scholarly members  of her Commission, got to know each  other
better while bantering about Thomism and  Confucianism over tea in
Roosevelt's  apartment.32  "I discovered," she wrote in her autobiogra-
phy, "that in  such informal  sessions we  sometimes  made  more pro-
gress  in  reaching  an  understanding  on  some  question  before  the
United Nations than we had been able to achieve in the formal work
30  See  MARY  ANN  GLENDON  ET AL.,  COMPARATIVE  LEGAL  TRADITIONS  58-62  (2d ed.
1994).
31  CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 112-13.
32  See ROOSEVELT,  supra note 25, at 317.
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of our committees."3 3  One group, however, remained resolutely aloof
from her  efforts.  "[I] t was  difficult  to  know  any Russian  well and  I
suppose the Kremlin  planned it that way.  It  was  really impossible  to
have  a private  and frank talk with  Russian officials. '3 4
At the next stage,  in July  1948,  Cassin and Roosevelt were heart-
ened when the Economic and Social  Commission  (chaired by Malik)
unanimously approved  the "final" draft submitted to it by the Human
Rights  Commission.3 5  That removed  the  last hurdle before  submis-
sion to the General Assembly.  But when the General Assembly began
its deliberations  on the Declaration  in September  1948,  the interna-
tional scene  was  extremely tense.  Relations were worsening between
the  Soviet Union and the  West.  The  Berlin  blockade  was  a  powder
keg waiting for a match.  Conflict had broken out in Greece and Ko-
rea.  Small nations were  becoming resentful  of the influence  of the
great  powers  and  suspicious  of their  motives.  Cynicism  and  power
politics had taken their toll on the mood of hopefulness  in which  the
human rights  project had been launched.  A decade  later, Roosevelt
told  an  interviewer,  "We  thought  we  were  presenting  such  a  good
draft  that  there would  be very little  discussion.  We found  we  were
mistaken.  In the big committee they argued  every word ....  And so
we  had some terrible  times in Paris. '36
It  took the  talents  of another  extraordinary  individual  to shep-
herd the Declaration  through the process of deliberation and revision
that led up to final adoption in December  1948.  That man was Malik,
a personable  Lebanese  philosophy professor  whose diplomatic  skills
were  as  finely honed  as Cassin's  legal talents. 37  Malik was  a familiar
figure  on  the  little  gray  TV  screens  of the  1950s.  Well-respected
among delegates from many different parts of the world, he was fre-
quently elected  to leadership  positions in the U.N.,  including mem-
33  ROOSEVELT,  supra note 25,  at 305.
34  Id. at 311.
35  See CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 112; see also ROOSEVELT,  supra note 25,  at 320.
36  LANCER,  supra note  1.
37  For biographical information,  see  Charles Habib Malik, in CURRENT  BIOGRAPHY
410  (Anna Rothe ed.,  1948).  Though a prominent figure  on the international scene
throughout  the 1950s, Malik always described himself as primarily a philosopher and
theologian.  He earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University, and taught at Harvard, Beirut
University,  and Catholic University. Jude  P. Dougherty,  Charles Habib Malik, in YEAR-
BOOK-1989 237  (American Philosophical Society ed., 1990).  A Greek Orthodox Chris-
tian, Malik frequently defended  Arab and  Palestinian views  in the U.N. in the  early
1950s, but later found himself at odds with Arab leaders on various issues.  The 1987
Reuter  obituary cryptically  reports, "None of Lebanon's  Moslem or pro-Syrian politi-
cians  or militia  leaders mourned  Malik's  death."  Lebanon's Christians  Mourn Veteran
Diplomat Charles Malik, REUTER LIBR.  REP.,  Dec.  29,  1987.
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bership  on the  Security  Council and the Presidency  of the General
Assembly.3 8  During the period leading up to the adoption of the Dec-
laration, he wore  many hats,  serving as  the Human Rights  Commis-
sion's  Rapporteur,  an  active  member  of  the  four-person  working
group on the draft, and President of the Economic and Social Council
to which the Commission reported.  When  the draft Declaration was
ready to be taken to the General Assembly, it was the ubiquitous Malik
who  chaired  the  three-person  group  that steered  it through  more
than eighty stormy meetings in Paris  in the fall  of 1948.
Malik's  fluency  in  many  languages,  including  Arabic,  French,
German,  and English, enabled him to move  easily between East and
West, and between large and small nations.  He made the most of the
fact that the document  reflected input from diverse  sources, and he
took  pains  to point  each  country  to  the places  in  the  Declaration
where it could  either find its  own contributions,  or the influence  of
the  culture to which it belonged.39  At many stages, he was aided by
Mrs. Roosevelt, who was a shaper as well as a wielder of the influence
of the United States. 40
The Soviet Union, represented by the intelligent and voluble Pro-
fessor A.P. Pavlov, made repeated efforts to stall and drag out the pro-
cess.  "[Pavlov]  was an orator of great power," Roosevelt recalled, "his
words rolled out of his black beard like a river, and stopping him was
difficult."'41  With  each delay, the prospects for success  grew dimmer,
to the point where  Cassin began to fear that all his work might go for
naught.42  But  Malik  was  up  to  the  challenge.  Durward  Sandifer,
Roosevelt's  State  Department  adviser,  described  Malik  as  "the only
person  I  ever  knew  who  succeeded  in  holding  a  stopwatch  to
Pavlov."
43
Malik directed his arguments to the public and posterity as well as
to his fellow delegates.  Unlike previous rights declarations which had
sprung from  particular  cultures,  he  said,  the  Universal  Declaration
was "a composite synthesis of all these outlooks and movements and of
38  See Former Lebanese Foreign Minister  Malik Dies, REUTER  LIB.  REP.,  Dec. 29,  1987.
39  See Charles  Malik,  The Challenge of Human Rights, in BEHIND  THE  HEA  LINES,
Dec. 1949, at 2.
40  For an account of Roosevelt's  subtle but influential role, see JOSEPH P.  LASH,
ELEANOR: THE YEARS  ALONE  56-81  (W.W. Norton & Co.  1972).  Cassin remembered
her as "a  political woman who was  sensitive to opinion, and who showed remarkable
skill in dealing with Indian and Lebanese philosophers, American statesmen and dip-
lomats,  as  well as delegates  from old Europe and the Eastern world."  GAssnN,  supra
note  24, at 82.
41  ROOSzEELT,  supra note 25, at 320.
42  See AGi,  supra note 27, at 231.
43  LASH,  supra note 40, at 78.
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much  Oriental  and  Latin  American  wisdom.  Such  a  synthesis  has
never  occurred  before  in  history."44  The  Latin  American  countries
had brought to  the  process  the ideas and experience  gained  in pre-
paring the  1948 Pan-American  Declaration  on the Rights and Duties
of Man; India had played a key role in advancing  the non-discrimina-
tion principle, especially with respect to women; the United Kingdom
and  the United States  had shared the wisdom acquired in their long
experience  with  traditional  political  and  civil  liberties;  the  Soviet
Union had championed the cause of improving the living conditions
of the broad mass of people; the  importance  of including duties had
been emphasized  by participants from China, Latin America, the  So-
viet Union, and  France;  many  smaller  countries  contributed  to  the
articles on freedom of religion and the rights of the family; the social,
economic,  and cultural  rights had numerous fathers  and mothers.45
The  debates wore on for  two months,  often lasting late into  the
night.46  Finally, on December  10,  1948,  in spite of the deteriorating
international situation, the Declaration was approved without a single
dissenting  vote.  Malik  and  Roosevelt  received  a standing  ovation.47
Clouds loomed on the  horizon, however.  Eight countries, including
the  entire  socialist  bloc, abstained:  Byelorussia,  Czechoslovakia,  Po-
land,  Saudi  Arabia,  South  Africa,  the  Soviet  Union,  Ukraine,  and
Yugoslavia.
48
Today, when  one  reads  what  Cassin,  Malik, Maritain,  McKeon,
Roosevelt,  and  their  colleagues  said and wrote  many years  ago, it is
striking that they foresaw nearly every problem their enterprise would
encounter-its buffeting from power politics, its dependence  on com-
mon  understandings  that  would  prove  elusive,  its  embodiment  of
ideas of freedom and solidarity that would be difficult to harmonize,
and  its vulnerability  to politicization  and misunderstanding.  It  is  of
interest, therefore,  to see how they attempted to protect it against the
most egregious  forms of manipulation.
III.  KNOWING THE  DECLARATION
4 9
The Universal Declaration,  with its thirty short articles, seems  at
first glance to invite comparison  with older rights documents  such as
44  Malik,  supra note 39, at 1;  see also CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 233.
45  See Malik,  supra note 39,  at 1-3.
46  See  ROOSEVELT,  supra note 25,  at 320.
47  See Charles Habib Malik, supra note 37, at 412.
48  See Charles Malik,  Human Rights in the United Nations,  U.N. BULL.,  Sept.  1952, at
49  For  the  reader's  convenience,  the  Universal  Declaration  appears  as  an
Appendix  infra at 1177.
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the Magna  Carta, the French  Declaration  of the Rights  of Man  and
the Citizen, and the first ten amendments to the U.S.  Constitution.  In
recent  years,  American  influence  upon  the  international  human
rights movement has become so pervasive that the Declaration is now
widely read as Americans  read the Bill of Rights:  as a string of essen-
tially separate guarantees.  As  we shall see, however, that approach  is
inappropriate  for an organic  document  like the Declaration.50  The
Declaration  is  not a list or a  "bill," but a  set of principles  that are
related  to one another and to certain over-arching ideas.  It possesses
an integrity  which has  considerable  strength when  the document is
read as it was meant to be read, namely as a whole.
Cassin  often compared  the Declaration  to the portico of a tem-
ple.51  (He  had  no  illusions  that the  document  could  be  anything
more  than  an  entryway  to  a future  where  human  rights  would  be
respected.)  He  saw the Preamble, with its eight "whereas" clauses,  as
the courtyard steps moving by degrees from the recognition of human
dignity to the unity of the human family to the aspiration for peace on
earth.  The general principles  of dignity, liberty, equality, and frater-
nity, proclaimed  in Articles  1  and  2,  are  the  portico's  foundation
blocks.  The facade consists of four equal columns crowned by a pedi-
ment.  The four pillars are: the personal liberties  (Articles  3 through
11);  the rights of the individual in  relation  to  others and to various
groups (Articles 12 through 17); the spiritual, public, and political lib-
erties (Articles 18 through 21); and the economic, social, and cultural
rights  (Articles  22  through  27).  The pediment  is  composed of the
three  concluding articles,  28 through  30, which establish  a range  of
connections between the the individual and society.
Let us stroll through the portico, noting the relations  among its
parts, and some of the more interesting architectural details.
The Preamble  begins  by asserting the dependence  of freedom,
justice, and peace upon  the universal  recognition  of human  dignity
and rights.  It announces the principal innovation  of the Declaration:
that human  rights  are  universal, belonging  to  "all  members  of the
human family."  In other words, it repudiates  the long-standing  view
that the relation between a sovereign  state and its own citizens  is that
nation's own  business.
The Preamble  then evokes the circumstances that give rise to the
need for universal standards:  "[D]isregard  and contempt for human
50  For a convincing argument that the clause-by-clause  approach is also inappro-
priate  for the Bill of Rights, see Akhil Reed Amar,  The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE. L.J.  1131  (1991).
51  See AGI,  supra note 27, at 317.
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rights have  resulted  in barbarous  acts  which  have outraged  the  con-
science of mankind."  It goes on  to speak of hopes for a better world
where  human  beings  may  enjoy what  most U.S.  readers  of the  day
would  have  recognized  as Franklin  Roosevelt's  four freedoms:  "free-
dom  of speech  and  belief and  freedom  from  fear  and  want."52  It
points toward  a future when rights will be  "protected by  the rule  of
law" and by "the development  of friendly relations  among nations."
The  Preamble  then anchors  the  Declaration  firmly in  the  U.N.
Charter:
Whereas the people of the United Nations have in the Charter reaf-
firmed their faith  in fundamental  human  rights, in the  dignity and
worth  of the  human  person  and  in  the equal  rights  of men  and
women and have determined  to promote social progress and better
standards  of life in larger freedom  ....
By expressly including women, by alluding to freedom from want,
and by evoking the U.N. Charter's commitment to better standards of
life,  the  Preamble  signals  from the  outset  that this  document is not
just a  "universalization"  of the  traditional  eighteenth  century "rights
of man," but part of a new "moment" in the history of human rights.
In this respect, the Universal Declaration  belongs to the family of post-
World War II rights instruments  that attempted to graft social justice
onto  the trunk of the tree of liberty.  Most of these  instruments  also
bear traces  of roots in a past before  the first rights moment.  In the
Declaration, for example, human dignity is said to be "inherent"; dig-
nity  and  rights  are  "recognized,"  not conferred;  human  beings  are
said to be "born" free and equal, and "endowed" with reason and con-
science;  the  family  is  "natural"  as  well  as  fundamental.  Hence
MacIntyre's  warning  about  incommensurable  moral  premises.  The
framers hoped, however, that the graft, the  tree, and the roots would
nourish one another.
The  Preamble  is  followed  by  a  Proclamation  clause  which  an-
nounces  the nature  of the  document.5 3  The  Declaration  is  to be "a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations" toward
which  "every  individual  and  every  organ  of society" should  "strive"
52  Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Message  (Jan. 6,  1941),  in 1940
THE PUBLIC  PAPERS  AND  ADDRESSES  OF FRANKLIN D.  ROOSEVELT  663  (1941).
53  One of the first decisions made by the  Commission on Human Rights was  that
the "international bill of rights" it had been asked to prepare should be in the form of
a declaration  rather  than  a  legally  binding  treaty  or  covenant.  The  international
human  rights  system  that  grew up  subsequently  includes  many treaties  and  conve-
nants, including the two  1966 covenants that were adopted to implement the Univer-
sal  Declaration,  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the
International  Covenant on  Economic,  Social  and Cultural  Rights.
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(and by which the conduct of nations and peoples can be measured).
The Proclamation implicitly acknowledges  the hurdles ahead, stating
that "a common understanding" of the Declaration's  rights and free-
doms  "is  of the  greatest importance  for  the full  realization  of this
pledge."
The Declaration proper then begins, not with a right, but in civil
law fashion, with two introductory  general articles.  It was at Cassin's
insistence that a declaration purporting  to be universal should begin
with a statement of what all human beings have in common.54  Thus
the first article  reads:  "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards  one another in a spirit of brotherhood."  It speaks
volumes about the spirit  of Cassin, a World War I veteran  of Jewish
ancestry who  had lost  twenty-one relatives  in  concentration camps, 55
that he insisted on beginning  the Declaration with an affirmation  of
faith in human conscience and rationality.  In 1968, that largeness  of
spirit was recognized when he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his
years  of work on behalf of human  rights.
Article  2's  emphatic statement of the anti-discrimination  princi-
ple underlines  the principle  of universality.  "Everyone" in the Decla-
ration means everyone-"without  distinction of any kind."
The Declaration then turns, in Articles 3 to  11,56 to familiar indi-
vidual rights that had already received a significant degree  of recogni-
tion,  if not implementation,  in various  legal  systems:  rights  to life,
liberty,  and personal  security;  bans  on slavery  and torture;  rights  to
legal recognition, equality before the law, effective remedies for viola-
tion of fundamental rights, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and de-
tention;  and guarantees  of fair criminal  procedures, presumption  of
innocence, and the principle  of non-retroactivity in criminal  law.
In Cassin's view, the rights in this first group were mainly directed
toward protecting individuals as such from aggression, while the rights
in Articles  12  to  17 were more concerned with protecting people in
their relations with  others and within civil society.57  His second  col-
umn includes the right to be free of arbitrary interference with one's
"privacy, family, home, or correspondence" and from arbitrary attacks
upon  one's "honor and reputation";  freedom  of movement and the
right of return;  the right to political asylum; the right to a nationality;
54  See DE  LA  CHAPEIt,  supra note 26, at 83.
55  See CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 213.
56  Here,  I follow  Cassin's quadripartite  division  of the  body of the Declaration,
although it seems to me  that other groupings are plausible  as well.
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provisions on marriage and the family;  and the right to own property.
This second group of rights is less precisely formulated  than the first,
leaving  larger  scope  for  variation  in  different  social  and  political
contexts.
Article  16, dealing with marriage  and the family, is a blend of old
and new ideas with varying  genealogies.  It went far beyond most na-
tional  legislation  of the  day with  its  affirmation  of the  principle  of
equal  rights between  spouses.  The idea that the family "is entitled to
protection  by society and  the State,"  on  the other hand, was familiar
in many countries as legislative policy, had already appeared in several
constitutions, and would  shortly appear in  many others.58
Cassin's  third pillar, Articles  18 through  21,  covers freedoms  of
religion and belief in Article  18; opinion, expression, and communica-
tion in Article  19; assembly and association in Article  20; and the prin-
ciple  of participatory democratic government in Article  21.  Article 18
is noteworthy for its fairly detailed specification  of the content of reli-
gious  freedom.  The  Human  Rights  Commission  had  been  on  the
verge of going forward with a draft that spoke only of conscience and
belief, but when Roosevelt interjected  that a text protecting religious
freedom ought to use the word "religion," that view carried the day.59
In  its  final form, Article  18  not only protects  religious  freedom  ex-
pressly, but acknowledges  the right to manifest one's beliefs in public
as well as in private, and "in community with others" (this latter point
due to  an amendment by  Malik to  Cassin's more  individualistic  ren-
dering of the concept).60
Apart from the aspiration to universality, the most innovative part
of the Declaration was  its fourth  pillar, Articles  22 through 27, which
elevates  to  fundamental  right status several  "new" economic,  social,
and  cultural  rights.  As memories  fade,  it is sometimes  assumed  that
this collection  of rights was  included  mainly  as  a concession  to  the
Soviets.  The fact  is,  however,  that  support for these  ideas  was  very
broad-based.
The  Declaration's  social  and  economic  rights  provisions  drew
from  a variety  of sources.  They  contained  more  than  an  echo  of
FDR's  proposed  "second  bill  of  rights, 61  a  legacy  which  Mrs.
58  The Preamble to the  1946 French  Constitution stated, "The nation  ensures to
the individual and the family the conditions  necessary to their development,"  CONsr.
preamble.  Germany's  Basic Law of 1949  provided, "Marriage  and family shall  enjoy
the special  protection  of the state,"  GRUNDGESETZ  [Constitution]  [GG]  art. 6,  1.
59  See DE LA  CHAPELLE,  supra note  26,  at 150.
60  See id. at 151.
61  Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt,  State  of the  Union  Message  (Jan.  11, 1944),  in
1944-45  THE  PUBLIC PAPERS  AND  ADDRESSES  OF  FRANKLIN  D.  RoosEvELT  32  (1950).
1  166 [VOL-  73:51998]   UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS  1167
Roosevelt  "through  her very  name,"  according  to  Malik,  "imported
into our council chambers. '62  (Officials  in the Truman State Depart-
ment were  initially  "lukewarm"  toward  the  idea  of social  and  eco-
nomic  rights,  but  Mrs.  Roosevelt  eventually  won  their  backing.) 6 3
This group  of rights  also bore  a close  resemblance to their  counter-
parts in the Preamble  of the  1946 French Constitution, the  1948  Bo-
gota Declaration  on the  Rights and  Duties of Man,  as well  as to the
programs  of socialist  and many  Christian  political  parties.  Similar
rights would soon appear in  most postwar and post-colonial  constitu-
tions, sometimes framed as obligations of society and the state.  At the
international  level, similar principles  had been recognized by the  In-
ternational  Labor Organization.
64
Much of what is  contained in Articles  23 and 24 was already the
common stuff of labor legislation in most liberal democracies  (decent
working  conditions  including  paid vacations  and limits  on working
hours; protection  against unemployment;  the  right to  form and join
unions).  Less widely recognized, however, were Article  23's "right to
work" and its "right to equal pay for equal work" without discrimina-
tion; Article 25's elevation of social welfare principles into a universal
right  to  a  decent  standard  of  living;  and  Article  26's  right  to
education.
Agreement  on the relation of the "new"  rights  to the  "old" was
much harder to achieve  than agreement  on their content.65  Accord-
ing to  Cassin, the sessions where  the  Commission wrestled with that
problem were extremely difficult and emotionally charged. 66  England
wanted the differences from  traditional civil and political liberties  to
be sharply emphasized.  It  took the position that the  social and eco-
nomic rights  should be handled in an entirely separate document.67
The Soviet Union, for its part, opposed any measure which would ap-
pear  to  relegate  social  and  economic  rights  to  an  inferior  rank.68
Madame  Mehta, the  Indian representative,  pointed out that poorer
nations could hope to move only gradually toward making such rights
a reality.
69
62  Charles  Habib  Malik,  Introduction, in 0. FREDERICK  NOLDE,  FREE  AND  EQUAL:
HuMAN  RIGHTS  IN  ECUMENICAL  PERSPECTIVE 7, 9  (1968).
63  See LASH,  supra note 40, at 62.
64  See STEINER  & ALSTON,  supra note 2, at 257-58.
65  See CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 110.
66  See id. at 110-11.
67  See id.
68  See id.
69  See ROOSEVELT,  supra note 25, at 318.NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
Cassin  finally resolved  the  impasse  by drafting  a "chapeau"  or
"umbrella" provision,  Article  22,  which  serves  as  a mini-preamble  to
the provisions dealing with social, economic, and cultural rights.  The
chapeau tried to satisfy the socialist bloc by making clear that the new
rights,  like  the  old,  are  "indispensable"  to  human  dignity.70  It re-
sponded to  the English and Indian concerns  by recognizing  that the
new rights stood on  a different footing from the old so far as imple-
mentation  was concerned.  Unlike  traditional  civil  rights, which  are
protected mainly through access  to courts, and political rights, which
are secured mainly through constitutional frameworks,  the economic
and social  rights require more  official  planning for their realization,
and are more dependent on each  country's  economic  situation.  Ac-
cordingly, Article  22 specifies that the economic and social  rights are
to be realized  "in accordance  with  the organisation  and resources  of
each  State."  It was  Mrs.  Roosevelt who,  in a particularly  heated  ses-
sion, came up with the words just quoted that finally permitted agree-
ment to be achieved.
7'
It is a credit to Cassin's skill that the "new" rights were not simply
tacked onto, but integrated with, the more traditional rights that pre-
ceded them.  Article 22 links the social, economic, and cultural rights
to  the protection  of the individual in such a way that each group of
rights  sheds  interpretive  light on  the  other.  The  "new"  rights  are
presented  as  rights  of the  individual,  "indispensable  for  his  dignity
and  the free  development  of his  personality."  The  last sentence  of
Article 26 on parents'  rights provides a bridge between the new right
to education and the older family protection idea of Article  16.  Simi-
larly, Article  27, while  recognizing  a new  "right to participate  in the
cultural  life  of the  community,"  looks  back  to  Article  17's  property
rights through  its reference to protecting scientific inventions and lit-
erary and artistic creations.
The last three sections of the Declaration, in Cassin's view, consti-
tuted the pediment of the portico covering the entire Declaration and
making essential  links between  the individual and society.72  Like the
Preamble and Articles  1 and 2,  these three sections bear importantly
70  Article  22:  "Everyone,  as  a member  of society ....  is  entitled  to the  realisa-
tion ...  in accordance with the organization and resources of each  State, of the eco-
nomic,  social,  and  cultural  rights  indispensable  for  his  dignity  and  the  free
development  of his personality."
71  See CASSIN,  supra  note 24, at 111.  According to one biographer, such inspired
interventions  by  Roosevelt  were  frequently prefaced  by  remarks  in  which  she  con-
ceded her interlocutor had a point, and with  disclaimers  such as  "of course,  I'm  a
woman and don't understand all these  things."  LASH,  supra note 40, at 69.
72  See AGI,  supra note 27, at 336.
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on the  meaning  of the document as  a whole.  They address  certain
conditions  that are  prerequisite  to  the realization  of the  rights and
freedoms enumerated in the Declaration.  Once  again, a general arti-
cle serves  as a kind of mini-preamble  to illuminate what follows.  Arti-
cle 28, the invention  of Charles Malik,73 speaks of a right to a certain
kind of order: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realised."
Two  necessary features  of an order where  rights  can be realized
are  then  spelled out, but quickly qualified,  in Article  29:  "Everyone
has  duties to  the  community"  (but to  a certain  kind of community,
where "the free and full development of his personality is possible"),
and everyone's  rights are subject to  limitations (but only "for the pur-
pose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and free-
doms  of others  and  of meeting  the just requirements  of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society").  A fur-
ther limit on rights is the subject of Article 30: "Nothing in this Decla-
ration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person
any right to  engage  in any activity  or perform any act aimed at the
destruction  of any of the rights  and freedoms set forth herein."
When Cassin described these last three articles as linking the indi-
vidual and society, he was referring to  the way the Declaration  han-
dled a problem  that had arisen  in the drafting  process.  Where  was
primary responsibility for implementing human rights to lie?  Even if
an international enforcement machinery were to be created someday,
that could not be the first line of defense.  The Soviet representative
had insisted that the sentence,  "This shall be enforced by the state,"
be appended to many articles.74  In the spring of 1948, upon re-read-
ing the draft, the Commission members came to the conclusion that a
misleading impression  had been  created.  Cassin recalled:
It was apparent that its provisions repeatedly referred to the role of
the State,  as if that were  the permanent  and only  agency  for the
protection  and regulation of the rights of man.  But man must be
envisaged not only in his relations with the State, but with the social
groups of all  sorts to which  he belongs: family,  tribe,  city,  profes-
sion,  confession,  and more broadly the  global human community.
Amendments were needed in order to remove all ambiguity on this
point.
75
73  See CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 111.
74  See ROOSEVELT,  supra note  25, at 317.
75  GASSIN,  supra note 24, at 10;  see also Aci,  supra note 27, at 230.
1998] 116 9NOTRE  DAME  LAW  REVIEW
In the view of Cassin and others, it had to be made clear that the
responsibility for protecting human  rights  belonged not  only to  the
nation states, but to persons and groups below and above the national
level.  The Declaration  was  thus ahead of its  time in recognizing the
importance  for human freedom  of a wide range  of social groups, be-
ginning with families, and extending  through the institutions of civil
society, nation states, and international organizations.  The Proclama-
tion clause calls not only "all peoples and all nations" but "every organ
of society"  to  promote recognition  and observance  of human  rights.
In the main body of the Declaration, individuals are protected in their
social  as well  as political settings.  The rights  to own property and to
participate in important institutions of civil society-religious groups,
labor  organizations,  and  families-are  guaranteed  along  with  the
right to  take  part in government.  The family  as such is  a subject  of
human rights protection,  to be provided,  significantly, "by society" as
well as  the state  (Article  16,  3).  Article  28's right "to a social and
international  order in which  the rights and freedoms" of the Declara-
tion can be fully realized is the  capstone of this group  of provisions.
The Declaration  as a whole  leaves  "no room for doubt,"  Cassin
said in his Nobel speech, "concerning the essential  question whether
the nations  have  retained  or lost  their traditional  exclusive jurisdic-
tion  over the  treatment  of their  citizens.  That national jurisdiction
will always  be at the base.  It will remain primary.  But it will no longer
be exclusive.
'76
The principal architects of the Declaration believed that the most
effective  defense  of human  rights would  ultimately be  "in the  mind
and  the  will  of the  people. '77  "In  the  eyes  of the Declaration's  au-
thors," Cassin wrote, "respect for human rights depends first and fore-
most on the mentalities of individuals and social groups. '78  Roosevelt
mused  in a  1958 interview:
Where, after all,  do human rights  begin?  In small places,  close  to
home-so close and small that they cannot be seen on any maps of
the world  ....  Unless  these rights have meaning  there, they have
little  meaning anywhere.  Without concerned citizen  action  to up-
hold them close  to home, we  shall look in vain for progress in the
larger world.
79
In sum, even a cursory reading of the Declaration  in its entirety
shows that it is no mere  list of rights.  In  form, as  distinct from  con-
76  CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 171.
77  NOLDE,  supra note 62, at 70.
78  CASSIN,  supra note 24, at 155.
79  LASH,  supra note 40,  at 81.
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tent, the Declaration  is recognizably a product of the drafting tradi-
tion that had been brought to its highest degree  of refinement in the
code-based  continental  European  legal  systems.  The  new rights  in-
struments  emerging  from  that tradition were  patterned  on  the  old
codes in certain respects-their level of generality, the use of general
clauses,  the  mutually  conditioning  relations  among their  parts,  and
the aspiration  to be enduring.  It follows  that the Declaration  is best
understood through the methods of interpretation that are associated
with that tradition.
The broad elements of those methods can be briefly summarized.
The  interpreter  begins  by  reading  the  text  as  a  whole,  becoming
aware of the interpretive guides that are embedded in it.  Ordinarily,
the text contains  a few general principles  that apply to the entire doc-
ument, supplemented  by special  principles  governing  particular sec-
tions.  Tension  or  conflict  among  principles  and  provisions  is
approached with a view toward respecting the priorities established in
the text, and, if possible,  optimizing the scope of each  principle in-
volved.  Each interpretation should support the unity of the text.
Though there is wide consensus in the civil law world on the ele-
ments of an approach  to interpretation, that does not preclude lively
controversy  on  specific  applications.80  And,  in  the  case  of human
rights  documents,  laden  with  open-ended  general  clauses,  there  is
plenty of room for debate  as well as for reasoned elaboration  of prin-
ciple.  Anticipating  the incoherence  critique  mounted by Villey and
others, McKeon tried to put the paradoxes of human rights in a posi-
tive  light.  "[They]  are  not ambiguities  resulting from  confusion  or
contradiction;" he argued, "they are productive ambiguities which em-
body the knowledge  and experience  men have acquired  in the long
history of rights, and which provide  the beginning points for further
advances."8'  The history of human  rights is  paradoxical  because  "it
embodies concretely all the great antitheses and paralogisms explored
by philosophers-the  problems of the whole and the part, the univer-
sal and the particular, the internal and the external, the apparent and
the real."
8 2
Accepting McKeon's characterization, what then is to prevent the
interpretation  of a document  embodying  those great  tensions from
degenerating  into  utter  chaos?  Maritain  had stressed  the  need  for
80  See Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation,  Schools ofJuprudence,  and Anthropol-
ogy: Some Remarks from a German Point of View,  42 AM. J. COMp.  L. 395  (1994).
81  RICHARD  MCKEON,  FREEDOM  AND  HISTORY  56 (1968).
82  Id. at 49.
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some  "ultimate value  whereon  those  rights  depend and in  terms  of
which  they are integrated by mutual limitations."
8 3
But does  the Declaration  have such an ultimate  value?  An  obvi-
ous candidate is  human dignity.  Dignity enjoys pride of place in the
Declaration: it is affirmed ahead of rights at the very beginning of the
Preamble; it is accorded priority again in Article  1; and it is woven into
the  text at three other key points, connecting  the Declaration  to  the
Charter in the fifth clause of the Preamble, introducing the social and
economic  rights in the "chapeau"  (Article 22),  and in Article 23's ref-
erence  to "an existence  worthy of human  dignity."
The drafters fleshed out the dignity concept by connecting it to a
fairly specific image of the human person.  Human beings are said to
be "endowed with  reason and conscience,"  and they are expected to
"act towards  one  another in a spirit of brotherhood."  The  Declara-
tion's "everyone"  is envisioned  as an individual,  uniquely valuable  in
himself.  (There  are  three  separate  references  to  the  "free develop-
ment of his personality.")  But "everyone"  is also portrayed as situated
in families, communities, workplaces,  associations,  societies,  cultures,
nations, and an emerging international  order.  In fact, Article 28 tells
us that it is in community "alone" that the "free and full development
of his  personality  is  possible."  Though  its  main  body is  devoted  to
basic freedoms,  the Declaration  begins and ends with exhortations  to
solidarity  (Articles  1 and  29).  Whatever  else  may be said of him  or
her, the Declaration's  "everyone"  is not a lone bearer  of rights.
It  is instructive to consider, in this connection, the approach that
one of the world's most respected constitutional courts has taken to its
own  dignitarian  rights  document,  approximately  contemporaneous
with the Universal Declaration.  The  German  Basic Law of 1949,  pre-
pared under the watchful  eyes of the Allied powers, begins by declar-
ing in Article  1:  "The dignity of man shall be inviolable.  To  respect
and protect it shall  be the  duty of all  state authority."  In  one  of its
earliest-and most frequently cited-decisions, the German Constitu-
tional  Court  drew  from  the  Basic  Law  as  a whole  a picture  of the
human  person  that has  informed  many  subsequent  decisions:  "The
image  of man in  the Basic  Law  is  not that of an isolated, sovereign
individual.  The Basic Law resolves the tension between individual and
society by relating  and binding the individual to  society, but without
detracting from the intrinsic value of the person. '84  As one commen-
83  Maritain,  supra note  16, at 16.
84  The  Investment Aid  Case,  4 BVerfGE  7 (1954).
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tator puts it, "this implies a departure from classical individualism, but
at the same  time rejects  any form of collectivism. 85
Politically  savvy, philosophically sophisticated  creatures  that they
were, the Declaration's  framers  knew that the dignity  principle  pos-
sessed no special immunity to deconstruction, and that no document,
however  skillfully crafted,  was proof against manipulation.  Maritain
said  it best:  whether  the  music  played  on  the  Declaration's  thirty
strings will be "in tune with, or harmful to, human dignity," will de-
pend primarily on the extent to which a "culture of human  dignity"
develops.
8 6
IV.  REMEMBERING  THE  DECLARATION
To the disappointment of the framers, the adoption of the Decla-
ration was followed  by nearly two decades during which  the interna-
tional  human  rights  project  stalled  amidst  Cold  War  politics.8 7  By
1953,  Cassin was complaining bitterly about what he considered to be
the  "scandalous  politicization"  of  U.N.  agencies,  especially
UNESCO.""  In his  1968  Nobel  acceptance speech, he  deplored  the
delays which he said had been "very prejudicial" to the preparation of
covenants  to implement the  Declaration, and he blamed  the "desire
of certain powers  to  delay even modest measures  of implementation
out of concern for their national sovereignty. ' 8 9
As the  Cold War gradually thawed,  human rights  consciousness
did indeed increase.  But when the Declaration woke up, so to speak,
it was  like Rip Van Winkle, who  emerged  from his long slumber  to
find himself in a world where no one recognized him.  The architects
of the Declaration were mostly departed or inactive, and in their place
was forming a human  rights industry, much influenced by the ideas
about rights, both good and bad, that were developed  in the Ameri-
can judicial rights revolution.90  The U.N. itself had grown in size and
ambition;  its specialized  agencies,  employing  thousands  of interna-
tional  civil  servants,  were  surrounded  by,  and  symbiotically  inter-
twined with, various  lobbying groups.  The Declaration  began  to be
85  Kurt Sontheimer, Principles  of  Human Dignity in the Federal  Republic, in GERmANY
AND  ITS  BASIC LAW:  PAST,  PRESENT AND  FUTURE 213, 215  (Paul Kirchof & Donald Kom-
mers eds.,  1993).
86  Maritain,  supra note 16, at 16.
87  See CAssrIN,  supra note  24, at 226.
88  See ISRAEL,  supra note  27, at 234.
89  CAssrN,  supra note 24, at 170-71.
90  See generally MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  RIGHTS  TALK  (1991)  (especially Chapter 6);
Anthony Lester,  The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 537
(1988).
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widely, almost universally, read in the way that Americans read the Bill
of Rights,  that is,  as a string of essentially  separate  guarantees.
By  isolating  each  part  from  its  place  in  an  overall  design,  that
now-common  misreading  of  the  Declaration  promotes  misunder-
standing  and  facilitates  misuse.  The  popular  cafeteria  approach  to
the  Declaration's  rights  inevitably  means  that  the  devices  that were
supposed to support the integrity of the document would be ignored.
A major  casualty  has been  the  Declaration's  insistence  on  the  links
between  freedom and solidarity, just at a time when affluent nations
seem  increasingly  to  be washing  their  hands of poor  countries  and
peoples.  As for the aspiration to universality, with 185 flags now flying
outside  U.N.  headquarters,  it is natural  to  wonder whether the  idea
can withstand  the  stresses  of mutual  suspicion  and heightened  na-
tional  and ethnic assertiveness.
None of these problems have simple solutions.  National interests
and  healthy  economies  are important,  not  only in  themselves,  but
often for the  sake  of "better standards  of living in  larger freedom."
The  language  of the  Declaration  is ambiguous.  Principles  such  as
freedom  and solidarity  do sit uneasily with one another.  Meanwhile,
in the years since  1948, "barbarous acts that outrage the conscience of
mankind" have  recurred with  appalling regularity.  Universal  human
rights remain an elusive  dream.
At the  present juncture, friends of human rights could do worse
than to recall  the framers'  understandings of what a Declaration  call-
ing itself universal  can and cannot accomplish.  The men and women
of 1948 were  not naive about politics  or human  nature.  To  people
who had  lived  through two world  wars,  it was  evident  that "even  the
noblest  and  most  solemn  declarations  could  not  suffice  to  re-
store...  faith in human rights."91  For the Soviets, that was the end of
the  matter.  After the  final vote  in  the  U.N.,  Andrei  Vishinsky  con-
temptuously dismissed  the Universal  Declaration  as just a "collection
of pious phrases."
92
The Declaration's founding fathers and mothers  had a vastly dif-
ferent, but no less  realistic, outlook.  For them, the elusiveness  of the
goal did not mean it was not worth pursuing with all one's might and
main.  While not exaggerating  the importance  of their work, neither
did they underestimate the effects that might radiate from a common
statement  of  principles.  Malik  predicted  that  the  international
human rights project would contribute  to the formation of a "human
91  Maritain,  supra note 16, at 16-17.
92  John  Kenton,  Human Rights Declaration Adopted by  U.N.  Assembly,  N.Y.  TIMEs,
Dec.  11, 1948,  at Al.
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rights conscience," and accurately foresaw that it would help to "focus
the  eyes  of the world  on the  local scene."  The  Declaration  itself is
permeated with  the realism  as well  as  the hopes of the founders.  It
recognizes  that full implementation  requires  a common understand-
ing  that is  still far from  being achieved;  it  recognizes  that freedom
depends on certain social, political, and economic conditions; it antic-
ipates  and  attempts  to  forestall  the  most  egregious  forms  of
misintepretation.
So far as the tension between universal rights and particular tradi-
tions is concerned, the Declaration's framework is  capacious enough
to encompass  a degree  of pluralism.  Philosophers like  McKeon  and
Maritain did not regard recognition of universal rights and respect for
particular cultures as irreconcilable.  After all, rights emerge from cul-
ture, cannot be sustained without cultural underpinnings, and, to be
effective,  must become part of each people's way of life.
The UNESCO  committee theorists  did not believe a declaration
of universal principles  could,  or should, lead  to completely uniform
means of expressing and protecting basic  rights.  Why should there
not be different cultural expressions  of the universal human longing
for freedom, and different ways of pondering the eternal tensions be-
tween freedom and order, the individual and the group?  Ideally, each
rights  tradition would be enriched  as it put the  principles into  prac-
tice,  and the various experiences of the nations would in turn enrich
the understanding of universal rights.  With improved communication
and with the accumulation  of experiences  of successful cross-cultural
cooperation,  they hoped, areas of common understanding would ex-
pand.93  But there would always  be, as Maritain put it, different kinds
of music played  on the same  keyboard.94
That  equanimity  concerning  different  visions  of freedom  pro-
ceeded,  no  doubt,  from  modesty  concerning  the  state  of human
knowledge.  "No declaration  of human  rights will ever be  exhaustive
or  final,"  Maritain  concluded  after pondering  the  history of rights
ideas.95  The dynamic character of the relations among rights, the de-
velopment of new rights, and new applications of old rights, McKeon
added, would constantly "enrich their ambiguity."96
One philosopher's fertile ambiguity, of course,  is another's fatal
flaw.  As my own research has progressed, however, I have come to see
93  See McKeon,  supra note 81,  at 41.
94  See Maritain,  supra note 16,  at 16.
95  Jacques  Maritain,  On the Philosophy of Human Rights, in HUMAN  RIGHTS:  CoM-
MENTS AND  INTERPRETATIONS,  supra note 16,  at 72,  74.
96  McKEON,  supra note 81,  at 46, 50.
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the Declaration  as, on the whole, remarkably well-designed.  The flaws
in the human rights enterprise are less in its documentary  landmarks
than in the human person-with  all our potential for good and evil,
reason and impulse, trust and betrayal, creativity and destruction, self-
ishness, and cooperation.  All too familiar with  the defects in human
nature,  the  framers  nevertheless  staked their  faith,  in Article  1, on
"reason and conscience."  But they were under no illusions about the
precariousness  of that wager.
The Declaration  thus seems  to  me less  like  the  Tower of Babel
than  like  the  sculpture  by  Arnaldo  Pomodoro  that  dominates  the
plaza outside  the U.N. building in New York.  A gift from the govern-
ment of Italy, this marvel consists of an enormous sphere of burnished
bronze, perhaps suggesting a globe.  The sphere is pleasing to behold,
even though it startles with  its imperfection.  There are deep, jagged
cracks in its golden-hued surface, cracks too large to ever be repaired.
Perhaps it's cracked  because it's flawed  (like the broken world),  one
thinks.  Or maybe  (like an egg) it has to break in order for something
else to emerge.  Perhaps both.  Sure enough, when one peers into the
gashes on its surface, there is another beautiful golden sphere coming
along inside.  But that one  is already  cracked  too!
I have  no  idea what Italy  was  trying  to  tell the  United Nations!
But whatever is going on inside these spheres, it doesn't seem to be all
chance and accident.  There's a tremendous sense of motion, of dyna-
mism, of potency, of emergent probabilities.
Pomodoro's  emerging  spheres  poignantly evoke  the great prob-
lem of all politics:  to what extent  can the probabilities  be shifted by
reflection and choice, as distinct from the will of the stronger and the
blind forces of history and accident?97  One does not have to be moti-
vated by any love affair with the United Nations to appreciate  the im-
portance  of  a  small  core  of  principles  to  which  people  of vastly
different backgrounds  can  appeal.  To  give  up  on  the  existence  of
such principles is to give up on the possibility of cross-cultural deliber-
ation about the  human  future.  It is  to give up  on the  common  hu-
manity  that  makes  it  possible  for  people  of  different  cultures  to
deliberate about how we are to order our lives together in an interde-
pendent world.  The framers of the Universal Declaration  deserve bet-
ter, as do the millions of women, men, and children who still lack the
essentials for dignified living.
97  Cf THE  FEDERALIST  No. 1  (Alexander Hamilton).
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PREAMBLE
WiHmREAs  recognition  of the inherent  dignity  and  of the  equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace  in the world.
WHEREAS disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted
in  barbarous  acts which  have  outraged  the conscience  of mankind,
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been pro-
claimed as  the highest aspiration  of the common people.
WHEREAS  it is  essential,  if man  is  not  to  be  compelled  to  have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights  should be protected  by the rule of law.
WHEREAS  it is essential  to promote  the  development  of friendly
relations  between nations.
WHEREAS  the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the  human person and in the equal rights of men and wo-
men and have determined to promote social progress and better stan-
dards of life in larger freedom.
WHEREAS  Member States  have pledged themselves  to achieve,  in
co-operation with the United Nations,  the promotion of universal re-
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
WHEREAS a common understanding of these rights and freedoms




THIS UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION OF HUMAN  RIGHTS as a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,  to  the end that
every individual and every organ of  society, keeping  this Declaration
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these  rights and freedoms and by progressive  measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective rec-
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ognition and  observance, both  among the peoples of Member  States
themselves  and  among  the  peoples  of  territories  under  their
jurisdiction.
ARTICLE  1.  All  human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards  one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
ARTICLE 2.  Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore,  no  distinction  shall  be  made  on  the  basis of the
political, jurisdictional  or international  status  of the country or terri-
tory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
self-governing  or under any other limitation  of sovereignty.
ARTICLE  3.  Everyone  has the right to life, liberty and security  of
person.
ARTICLE 4.  No  one  shall be held in slavery  or servitude;  slavery
and  the  slave trade  shall be prohibited in all their forms.
ARTICLE 5.  No one shall be subjected  to torture or to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.
ARTICLE 6.  Every one has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law.
ARTICLE  7.  All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination  to  equal protection of the law.  All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination  in violation of this Decla-
ration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
ARTICLE  8.  Everyone  has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the  constitution or by law.
ARTICLE  9.  No  one shall be subjected  to arbitrary  arrest, deten-
tion or exile.
ARTICLE  10.  Everyone  is entitled to full equality to a fair and pub-
lic hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determi-
nation of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him.
ARTICLE  11.  (1)  Everyone  charged with  a penal offense  has  the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in
a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees  necessary for his
defense.  (2)  No  one shall be held guilty of any penal offense of any
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act  or omission which  did not constitute a penal  offence, under na-
tional or international  law, at the time when  it was committed.  Nor
shall a heavier  penalty be imposed than  the one that was applicable
at the time the penal offence was  committed.
ARTiciE  12.  No  one  shall  be  subject  to  arbitrary  interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,  nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference  or attacks.
ARTIc  13.  (1)  Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state.  (2)  Everyone has the
right  to leave  any  country, including  his  own,  and  to  return  to  his
country.
ARTICLE 14.  (1)  Everyone has the right to seek  and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from  persecution.  (2)  This right may not be
invoked in the case of prosecuiions  genuinely arising from non-polit-
ical crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
ARTIcLE  15.  (1)  Everyone  has the right to a nationality.  (2)  No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to  change his nationality.
ARIcLE  16.  (1)  Men and women of full age, without any limita-
tion due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, dur-
ing marriage,  and  at its  dissolution.  (2)  Marriage  shall  be  entered
into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.  (3)
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.
ARTICLE  17.  (1)  Everyone  has  the right own  property  alone  as
well  as in association  with others.  (2)  No one shall be arbitrarily  de-
prived of his property.
ARTIcLE  18.  Everyone  has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science  and religion;  this right includes freedom  to change  his reli-
gion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and  observance.
ARTICLE  19.  Everyone  has  the right to  freedom  of opinion and
expression;  this right includes freedom  to hold opinions without in-
terference  and  to  seek,  receive  and  impart information  and  ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
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ARTICLE  20.  (1)  Everyone  has the  right to freedom  of peaceful
assembly and association.  (2)  No one may be compelled to belong to
an association.
ARTICLE 21.  (1)  Everyone has the right to take part in the govern-
ment of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2)  Everyone  has  the  right  of equal  access  to  public  service  in  his
country.  (3)  The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government;  this  will shall be expressed  in periodic and genuine
elections  which  shall be by universal and equal suffrage  and  shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
ARTICLE  22.  Everyone,  as a member of society, has  the  right to
social  security and  is  entitled  to realization,  through national  effort
and international  co-operation  and in accordance  with  the  organiza-
tion and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable  for his dignity and the free development  of his
personality.
ARTICLE  23.  (1)  Everyone  has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protec-
tion  against  unemployment.  (2)  Everyone,  without  any  discrimina-
tion,  has  the  right to  equal  pay for equal  work.  (3)  Everyone  who
works  has the right to just and favourable remuneration  ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and sup-
plemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.  (4) Eve-
ryone has the right to form and to join trade unions for protection of
his interests.
ARTICLE 24.  Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable  limitation  of working  hours  and periodic  holidays  with
pay.
ARTICLE  25.  (1)  Everyone  has  the  right to  a standard  of living
adequate  for the health  and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical  care and necessary  so-
cial services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood,  old age or other lack of livelihood  in
circumstances  beyond  his  control.  (2)  Motherhood  and childhood
are entitled to special care and assistance.  All children, whether born
in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same  social protection.
ARTICLE  26.  (1)  Everyone has the right to education.  Education
shall be free, at least in the  elementary and fundamental  states.  Ele-
mentary education  shall be  compulsory.  Technical  and professional
education  shall  be  made  generally  available  and  higher  education
shall be equally assessible  to all on the basis of merit.  (2)  Education
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shall be  directed  to  the full  development  of the human  personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms.  It shall promote understanding,  tolerance  and friend-
ship among  all  nations, racial  or religious  groups,  and shall  further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.  (3)
Parents have a prior right to  choose the kind of education  that shall
be given  to their children.
ARTIcLE 27.  (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scien-
tific advancement and its benefits.  (2)  Everyone has the right to  the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any sci-
entific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
ARncLE  28.  Everyone is entitled to a social and international or-
der in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can
be fully realized.
ARnCLE  29.  (1) Everyone has duties  to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.  (2)
In the exercise  of his rights  and freedoms, everyone  shall be subject
only to  such limitations as  are determined  by law solely for the pur-
pose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and free-
doms  of others  and  of meeting  the just requirements  of morality,
public  order  and  the  general  welfare  in  a  democratic  society.  (3)
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
ARTICLE  30.  Nothing in  this Declaration  may be interpreted  as
implying  for any State,  group or  person any right to  engage in any
activity or to perform  any act aimed at the  destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein.
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